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Three-player impartial games
James Propp
Department of Mathematics, University of Wisconsin
(November 10, 1998)
Past efforts to classify impartial three-player combinatorial games
(the theories of Li [3] and Straffin [4]) have made various restrictive
assumptions about the rationality of one’s opponents and the forma-
tion and behavior of coalitions. One may instead adopt an agnostic
attitude towards such issues, and seek only to understand in what
circumstances one player has a winning strategy against the com-
bined forces of the other two. By limiting ourselves to this more
modest theoretical objective, and by regarding two games as being
equivalent if they are interchangeable in all disjunctive sums as far
as single-player winnability is concerned, we can obtain an interest-
ing analogue of Grundy values for three-player impartial games.
0. INTRODUCTION
Let us begin with a very specific problem: Assume G is
an impartial (positional) game played by three people who al-
ternate moves in cyclic fashion (Natalie, Oliver, Percival, Na-
talie, Oliver, Percival, ...), under the convention that the player
who makes the last move wins. Let H be another such game.
Suppose that the second player, Oliver, has a winning strategy
for G. Suppose also that Oliver has a winning strategy for
H . Is it possible for Oliver to have a winning strategy for the
disjunctive sum G+H as well?
Recall that an impartial positional game is specified by
(i) an initial position, (ii) the set of all positions that can arise
during play, and (iii) the set of all legal moves from one posi-
tion to another. The winner is the last player to make a move.
To avoid the possibility of a game going on forever, we re-
quire that from no position may there be an infinite chain of
legal moves. The disjunctive sum of two such games G,H is
the game in which a legal move consists of making a move
in G (leaving H alone) or making a move in H (leaving G
alone). Readers unfamiliar with the theory of two-player im-
partial games should consult [1] or [2].
It is important to notice that in a three-player game, it is
possible that none of the players has a winning strategy. The
simplest example is the Nim game that starts from the posi-
tion 1 + 2, where 1 and 2 denote Nim-heaps of size one and
two respectively. As usual, a legal move consists of taking a
number of counters from a single heap. In this example, the
first player has no winning move, but his actions determine
whether the second or third player will win the game. None
of the players has a winning strategy. That is, any two players
can cooperate to prevent the remaining player from winning.
It is in a player’s interest to join such a coalition of size two if
he can count on his partner to share the prize with him – unless
the third player counters by offering an even bigger share of
the prize. This kind of situation is well known in the theory of
“economic” (as opposed to positional) games. In such games,
however, play is usually simultaneous rather than sequential.
Bob Li [3] has worked out a theory of multi-player posi-
tional games by decreeing that a player’s winnings depend
on how recently he has moved when the game ends (the last
player to move wins the most, the player who moved before
him wins the next most, and so on), and by assuming that each
player will play rationally so as to get the highest winnings
possible. Li’s theory, when applied to games like Nim, leads
to quite pretty results, and this is perhaps sufficient justifica-
tion for it; but it is worth pointing out that, to the extent that
game theory is supposed to be applicable to the actual playing
of games, it is a bit odd to assume that one’s adversaries are
going to play perfectly. Indeed, the only kind of adversaries
a sensible person would play with, at least when money is in-
volved, are those who do not know the winning strategy. Only
in the case of two-player games is it the case that a player has
a winning strategy against an arbitrary adversary if and only
if he has a winning strategy against a perfectly rational adver-
sary.
Phil Straffin [4] has his own approach to three-player
games. He adopts a policy (“McCarthy’s revenge rule”) gov-
erning how a player should act in a situation where he himself
cannot win but where he can choose which of his opponents
will win. Straffin analyzes Nim under such a revenge rule,
and his results are satisfying if taken on their own terms, but
the approach is open to the same practical objections as Li’s.
Specifically, if a player’s winning strategy depends on the as-
sumption that his adversaries will be able to recognize when
they can’t win, then the player’s strategy is guaranteed to work
only when his opponents can see all the way to the leaves of
the game tree. In this case, at least one of them (and perhaps
each of them) believes he can’t win; so why is he playing?
The proper response to such objections, from the point of
view of someone who wishes to understand real-world games,
is that theories like Li’s and Straffin’s are prototypes of more
sophisticated theories, not yet developed, that take into ac-
count the fact that players of real-life games are partly ratio-
nal and partly emotional creatures, capable of such things as
stupidity and duplicity.
It would be good to have a framework into which the theo-
ries of Li and Straffin, along with three-player game-theories
of the future, can be fitted. This neutral framework would
make no special assumptions about how the players behave.
Here, we develop such a theory. It is a theory designed to
answer the single question “Can I win?,” asked by a single
player playing against two adversaries of unknown character-
istics. Not surprisingly, the typical answer given by the theory
is “No”; in most positions, any two players can gang up on the
third. But it turns out that there is a great deal to be said about
those games in which one of the players does have a winning
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strategy.
In addition to the coarse classification of three-player
games according to who (if anyone) has the winning strategy,
one can also carry out a fine classification of games analogous
to, but much messier than, the classification of two-player
games according to Grundy-value. The beginnings of such
a classification permit one to answer the riddle with which
this article opened; the later stages lead to many interesting
complications which have so far resisted all attempts at com-
prehensive analysis.
1. NOTATION AND PRELIMINARIES
Games will be denoted by the capital letters G, H , X , and
Y . As in the two-player theory, we can assume that every
position carries along with it the rules of play to be applied, so
that each game may be identified with its initial position. The
game G′ is an option of G if it is legal to move from G to G′.
To build up all the finite games, we start from the null-game 0
(the unique game with no options) and recursively define G =
{G′1, G
′
2, ...} as the game with options G′1, G′2, .... The game
{0} will be denoted by 1, the game {0, 1} will be denoted by
2, and so on. (It should always be clear from context whether
a given numeral denotes a number or a Nim game.)
We recursively define the relation of identity by the rule
that G and H are identical if and only if for every option G′
of G there exists an option H ′ of H identical to it, and vice
versa. We define (disjunctive) addition, represented by +, by
the rule that G+H is the game whose options are precisely the
games of the form G′ +H and G+H ′. It is easy to show that
identity is an equivalence relation that respects the “bracket-
ing” and addition operations, that addition is associative and
commutative, and that 0 is an additive identity.
The following abbreviations will prove convenient:
GH means G+H
Gn means G+G+ ...+G (n times)
mn means {{· · · {m} · · · }} (n layers deep)
Thus, {12}345 denotes
{1 + 2}+ {1 + 2}+ {1 + 2}+ {{{{{4}}}}}.
(We’ll never need to talk about Nim-heaps of size > 9, so our
juxtaposition convention won’t cause trouble.) Note that for
all G, the games G0, G1, G0, and G are identical.
Relative to any non-initial position in the course of play, one
of the players has just moved (the Previous player) and one is
about to move (the Next player); the remaining player is the
Other player. At the start of the game, players Next, Other,
and Previous correspond to the first, second, and third play-
ers (even though, strictly speaking, there was no “previous”
move). We call G a Next-game (N -game) if there is a win-
ning strategy for Next, and we let N be the set of N -games;
N is the type of G, and G belongs to N . We defineO-games
and P-games in a similar way.
If none of the players has a winning strategy, we say that
G is a Queer game (Q-game). In a slight abuse of notation,
I will often use “=” to mean “belongs to”, and use the letters
N,O, P,Q to stand for unknown games belonging to these re-
spective types. Thus I will write 1 = N , 11 = O, 111 = P ,
etc.; and the problem posed in the Introduction can be formu-
lated succinctly as: solve O+O = O or prove that no solution
exists. (At this point I invite the reader to tackle Q+Q = O.
There is a simple and elegant solution.)
The following four rules provide a recursive method for
classifying a game:
(1) G is an N -game exactly if it has some P-game as an
option.
(2) G is an O-game exactly if all of its options are N -
games, and it has at least one option (this proviso pre-
vents us from mistakenly classifying 0 as an O-game).
(3) G is a P-game exactly if all of its options areO-games.
(4) G is a Q-game exactly if none of the above conditions
is satisfied.
Using these rules, it is possible to analyze a game com-
pletely by classifying all the positions in its game-tree, from
leaves to root.
2. SOME SAMPLE GAMES
Let us first establish the types of the simpler Nim games.
It’s easy to see that
0 = P,
1 = {0} = {P} = N,
11 = {1} = {N} = O,
111 = {11} = {O} = P,
and so on; in general, the type of 1n is P , N , or O according
as the residue of n mod 3 is 0, 1, or 2. Also
2 = N,
3 = N,
and so on, because in each case Next can win by taking the
whole heap.
12 = {1, 2, 11} = {N,N,O} = Q,
112 = {11, 12, 111} = {O,Q, P} = N,
1112 = {111, 112, 1111}= {P,N,N} = N,
11112 = {1111, 1112, 11111}= {N,N,O} = Q,
and so on; in general, the type of 1n2 isN ,Q, orN according
as the residue of n mod 3 is 0, 1, or 2. The winning strategy
for these N -games is simple: reduce the game to one of the
P-positions 13k.
1+ 1 = 11 is a solution of the equation N +N = O. Does
G = N imply that G+G = O in general? We can easily see
that the answer is “No”:
2 + 2 = 22 = {12, 2} = {Q,N} = Q.
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(12 is identical to 21, so they can be treated as a single option.)
Here are some more calculations which will be useful later.
{2} = {N} = O
{{2}} = {O} = P
{1, 11} = {N,O} = Q
{2, 11} = {N,O} = Q
3. ADDING GAMES
The type of G+H is not in general determined by the types
of G and H . (For example, 1 and 2 are both of type N , but
1+1 = O while 2+2 = Q.) That is, addition does not respect
the relation “belongs to the same type as”. To remedy this
situation we define equivalence (≡) by the condition that G ≡
H if and only if for all games X , G+X and H +X belong
to the same type. It is easy to show that “equivalence” is an
equivalence relation, that it respects bracketing and addition,
and that if G′ ≡ H ′ then {G′, H ′, ...} ≡ {H ′, ...} (that is,
equivalence options of a game may be conflated).
We are now in a position to undertake the main task of this
section: determining the addition table. Recall that in the two-
player theory, there are only two types (N and P) and their
addition table is as shown in Table 1.
+ P N
P P N
N N PN
Table 1. The two-player addition table.
Here, the entry PN denotes the fact that the sum of two N -
games can be either a P-game or an N -game.
The analogous addition table for three-player games is
given by Table 2.
+ P N O Q
P PQ NQ OQ Q
N NQ NOQ PNQ NQ
O OQ PNQ NQ NOQ
Q Q NQ NOQ OQ
Table 2. The three-player addition table.
Notice that in one particular case (namely G = P and H =
Q, or vice versa), knowing the types of G and H does tell one
which type G +H belongs to, namely Q. A corollary of this
is that P + P + ...+ P +Q = Q.
To prove that Table 1 applies, one simply finds solutions of
the allowed “equations” P + P = P , P + N = N (from
which N + P = N follows), N + N = P , and N + N =
N , and proves that the forbidden equations P + P = N and
P +N = P have no solutions. To demonstrate the validity of
Table 2, we must find solutions to twenty-two such equations,
and prove that the remaining eighteen have no solutions.
Table 3 shows the twenty-two satisfiable equations and their
solutions.
Equation Solution Equation Solution
P + P = P 0 + 0 P + P = Q {{2}}+ {{2}}
N + P = N 1 + 0 N + P = Q 1111 + {{2}}
N +N = O 1 + 1 O + P = Q {2}+ 111
O + P = O 11 + 0 O +N = Q 1 + {2}
O +N = P 11 + 1 O +O = Q {2}+ {2}
O +O = N 11 + 11 N +N = N 112 + 1
Q+ P = Q 12 + 0 N +O = N 2 + 11
Q+N = Q 12 + 2 Q+N = N 12 + 1
Q+O = Q 22 + 11 Q+O = N 12 + 11
Q+Q = Q 12 + 12 Q+O = O {2, 11}+ 11
N +N = Q 2 + 2 Q+Q = O {1, 11}+ {1, 11}
Table 3. Some sums.
And now, the proofs of impossibility for the eighteen im-
possible cases.
Claim 1. None of the following is possible.
O + P = N (1)
N + P = P (2)
O +O = P (3)
P + P = O (4)
O +N = O (5)
Proof. By (joint) infinite descent. Here, as in subsequent
proofs, the infinite-descent “boilerplating” is omitted.
Note that none of the hypothetical P-games in equations
(1)-(4) can be the 0-game, so all of these games X,Y have
options.
Suppose (1) holds; say X = O, Y = P , X + Y = N .
Some option X ′ + Y or X + Y ′ must be a P-game. But then
we have either N + P = P (every option X ′ must be an N -
game), which is (2), or O +O = P (every option Y ′ must be
an O-game), which is (3).
Suppose (2) holds; say X = N , Y = P , X+Y = P . Then
there exists X ′ = P , which must satisfy X ′+Y = P+P = O
(equation (4)).
Suppose (3) holds; say X = O, Y = O, X+Y = P . Then
there exists Y ′ = N , which must satisfy X + Y ′ = O+N =
O (equation (5)).
Suppose (4) holds; say X = P , Y = P , X+Y = O. Then
there exists X ′ = O, which must satisfy X ′ + Y = O+ P =
N (equation (1)).
Finally, suppose (5) holds; say X = O, Y = N , X + Y =
O. Then there exists Y ′ = P , which must satisfy X + Y ′ =
O + P = N (equation (1)).
Claim 2. None of the following is possible.
P + P = N (6)
O + P = P (7)
N + P = O (8)
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Proof. By infinite descent. A solution to (6) yields an (earlier-
created) solution to (7), which yields a solution to (8), which
yields a solution to (6).
Claim 3. It is impossible that
N +N = P (9)
Proof. By contradiction. A solution to (9) would yield a solu-
tion to (8).
Claim 4. None of the following is possible.
Q + P = N (10)
Q + P = P (11)
Q+O = P (12)
Q + P = O (13)
Q+N = O (14)
Proof. By infinite descent (making use of earlier results as
well).
Suppose (10) holds with X,Y . Some option X ′ + Y or
X + Y ′ must be a P-game. In the former event, we have
X ′ 6= P (since X = Q), so that either N + P = P (equation
(2)), O + P = P (equation (7)), or Q + P = P (equation
(11)); in the latter event we have Q+O = P (equation (12)).
Suppose (11) holds with X,Y . Since X = Q, it has an
option X ′ of type N or type Q (for if all options of X were
O-games andP-games,X would be of typeP orN ). If X ′ =
N , then we have X ′ + Y = N + P = O (equation (8)), and
if X ′ = Q, then we have X ′ + Y = Q + P = O (equation
(13)).
Suppose (12) holds with X,Y . ThenX+Y ′ = Q+N = O
(equation (14)).
Suppose (13) holds with X,Y . Since X = Q, it has an
option X ′ of type O or of type Q (for if all options of X
were N -games and P-games, X would be of type O or N ).
X ′ = O yields X ′ + Y = O + P = N (equation (1)), and
X ′ = Q yields X ′ + Y = Q+ P = N (equation (10)).
Finally, suppose (14) holds with X,Y . Then there exists
Y ′ = P , which must satisfy X+Y ′ = Q+P = N (equation
(10)).
Claim 5. It is impossible that
Q+N = P (15)
Proof. By contradiction. A solution to (15) would yield a so-
lution to (13).
Claim 6. Neither of the following is possible:
Q+Q = N (16)
Q+Q = P (17)
Proof. By infinite descent.
Suppose (16) holds with X,Y . Then some option of X +
Y must be a P-game; without loss of generality, we assume
X + Y ′ = P . But X = Q, and we have already ruled out
Q+ P = P (equation (11)), Q +N = P (equation (5)), and
Q+O = P (equation (12)), so we have X+Y ′ = Q+Q = P
(equation (17)).
Suppose (17) holds with X,Y . X must have an N -option
or Q-option X ′, but if X ′ = N then X ′ + Y = N +Q = O
(equation (14)), which can’t happen; so X ′ = Q. Similarly, Y
has a Q-option Y ′. X ′ + Y = O, so X ′ + Y ′ = Q+Q = N
(equation (16)).
(Note that the second half of this proof requires us to look
two moves ahead, rather than just one move ahead as in the
preceding proofs.)
The remaining case is surprisingly hard to dispose of; the
proof requires us to look five moves ahead.
Claim 7. It is impossible that
O +O = O (18)
Proof. By infinite descent. Suppose (18) holds with X,Y . For
all X ′ we have X ′ + Y = N , so that X ′ + Y must have some
P-option; but this P-option cannot be of the form X ′ + Y ′,
since N + N 6= P (equation (9)). Hence there must exist
an option X ′′ of X ′ such that X ′′ + Y = P . This implies
that X ′′ = N , since none of the cases O + O = P (equation
(3)), P + O = P (equation (7)), Q + O = P (equation (12))
can occur. Similarly, every Y ′ has an option Y ′′ such that
X+Y ′′ = P , Y ′′ = N . Since X ′′+Y is a P-game, X ′′+Y ′
and X ′ + Y ′′ areO-games and X ′′ + Y ′′ is an N -game. One
of the options of X ′′ +Y ′′ must be a P-game; without loss of
generality, say X ′′′+Y ′′ = P . Since Y ′′ = N and since none
of the cases N+N = P (equation (9)), P+N = P (equation
(2)), Q + N = P (equation (15)) can occur, X ′′′ must be an
O-game. But recall that X ′′+Y is aP-game, so that its option
X ′′′+Y is anO-game. This gives us X ′′′+Y = O+O = O,
which is an earlier-created solution to (18).
The proof of Claim 7 completes the proof of the validity
of Table 2. Observe that this final clinching claim, which an-
swers the article’s opening riddle in the negative, depends on
five of the preceding six claims. Our straightforward question
thus seems to lack a straightforward solution. In particular,
one would like to know of a winning strategy for the Natalie-
and-Percival coalition in the game G + H that makes use of
Oliver’s winning strategies for G and H . Indeed, it would be
desirable to have strategic ways of understanding all the facts
in this section.
At this point it is a good idea to switch to a notation that
is more mnemonically helpful than N , O, and P , vis-a`-vis
addition. Let 0, 1, and 2 denote the Nim-positions 0, 1, 11,
respectively. Also, let ∞ be the Nim-position 22. (Actually,
we’ll want these symbols to represent the equivalence classes
of these respective games, but that distinction is unimportant
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right now.) We will say that two games G, H are similar if
they have the same type; in symbols, G ∼ H . Every game is
thus similar to exactly one of 0, 1, 2, and ∞. We can thus use
these four symbols to classify our games by type; for instance,
instead of writing G = N , we can write G ∼ 1.
Here is the rule for recursively determining the type of a
game in terms of the types of its options, restated in the new
notation:
(1) G is of type 1 exactly if it has some option of type 0.
(2) G is of type 2 exactly if all of its options are of type 1,
and it has at least one option.
(3) G is of type 0 exactly if all of its options are of type 2.
(4) G is of type ∞ exactly if none of the above conditions
is satisfied.
Here is the new addition table for 3-player game types; it
resembles a faulty version of the modulo 3 addition table.
+ 0 1 2 ∞
0 0∞ 1∞ 2∞ ∞
1 1∞ 12∞ 01∞ 1∞
2 2∞ 01∞ 1∞ 12∞
∞ ∞ 1∞ 12∞ 2∞
Table 4. The new, improved three-player addition table.
It is also worthwhile to present the “subtraction table” as an
object of study in its own right. To this end define 3 = 111 as
an alternative to 0.
− 0 1 2 ∞
3 3 2 1 none
2 2 1 0∞ 2∞
1 1 All 12∞ 12
∞ All All All All
Table 5. The three-player “subtraction” table.
The minuend is indicated by the row and the subtrahend by
the column. Note that subtraction is not a true operation on
games; rather, the assertion “1 − 2 is 12∞” means that if
G,H are games such that G +H ∼ 1 and G ∼ 2 then H ∼
1, 2, or ∞.
The six entries in the upper left corner of the subtraction ta-
ble (the only entries that are single types) correspond to asser-
tions that can be proved by joint induction without any refer-
ence to earlier tables. In fact, a good alternative way to prove
that addition satisfies Table 4 would be to prove that addition
satisfies the properties implied by the six upper-left entries
in Table 5 (by joint induction) and then to prove three extra
claims: (i) if G ∼ 2 and H ∼ 2 then G + H 6∼ 2; (ii) if
G ∼ ∞ and H ∼ ∞ then G +H 6∼ 0; and (iii) if G ∼ ∞
and H ∼∞ then G+H 6∼ 1.
4. ADDING GAMES TO THEMSELVES
Another sort of question related to addition concerns the
disjunctive sum of a game with itself. Recall that in two-
player game theory, a strategy-stealing argument can be used
to show that the sum of a game of type N with itself must be
of type P (even though a sum of two distinct games of type
N can be of either type P or typeN ).
We seek a similar understanding of what happens when we
add a three-player game to itself. Table 6 shows the possible
types G + G can have in our three-player theory, given the
type of G.
G G+G
0 0∞
1 2∞
2 1∞
∞ 2∞
Table 6. The doubling table.
To verify that all the possibilities listed here can occur, one
can simply look at the examples given at the beginning of Sec-
tion 3. To verify that none of the omitted possibilities can oc-
cur, it almost suffices to consult Table 4. The only possibility
that is not ruled out by the addition table is that there might be
a game X with X ∼ 1, X +X ∼ 1.
Suppose X were such a game. Then X would have to have
a P-option X ′1 (now we call it a 0-option) along with another
option X ′2 such that X + X ′2 ∼ 0. This implies that X ′1 +
X ′2 ∼ 2 and X ′2 + X ′2 ∼ 2. Since X ′1 ∼ 0, the condition
X ′1 + X
′
2 ∼ 2 implies (by way of Table 4) that X ′2 ∼ 2.
But X ′2 + X ′2 ∼ 2 implies (by way of Table 4) that X ′2 ∼
1 or∞. This contradiction shows that no such game X exists,
and completes the verification of Table 6.
In the same spirit, we present a trebling table (Table 7),
showing the possible types G + G + G can have given the
type of G.
G G+G+G
0 0∞
1 0∞
2 0∞
∞ ∞
Table 7. The trebling table.
To prove that all the possibilities listed in the first three rows
can actually occur, one need only check that 0 + 0 + 0 ∼ 0,
{{2}}+{{2}}+{{2}} ∼∞, 1+1+1 ∼ 0, 2+2+2 ∼∞,
11+ 11 + 11 ∼ 0, and {2}+ {2}+ {2} ∼∞. To prove that
the nine cases not listed cannot occur takes more work.
Four of the cases are eliminated by the observation that G+
G + G can never be of type 1 (the second and third players
can always make the Next player lose by using a copy-cat
strategy). Tables 3 and 5 allow one to eliminate three more
cases. The next two claims take care of the final two cases.
5
Claim 8. If G ∼∞, then G+G+G 6∼ 2.
Proof. Suppose X ∼∞ with X+X+X ∼ 2. Let Xα be an
option of X . Since Xα+X+X ∼ 1, Xα+X+X must have
a 0-option of the form Xα + Xβ + X (for Xβ some option
of X) or of the form Xαγ +X +X (for Xαγ some option of
Xα). In either case, we find that the ∞-game X , when added
to some other game (Xα +Xβ or Xαγ +X), yields a game
of type 0; this is impossible, by Table 4.
Claim 9. If G ∼ 2, then G+G+G 6∼ 2.
Proof. Suppose X ∼ 2 with X + X + X ∼ 2. Notice that
X ′ +X +X ∼ 1 for every option X ′ of X .
Case I: There exist options Xα, Xβ of X (possibly the
same option) for which Xα + Xβ + X ∼ 0. Then its op-
tion Xα + (Xβ + Xβ) ∼ 2. Since Xα ∼ 1, Table 5 gives
Xβ +Xβ ∼ 1. But this contradicts Table 6, since Xβ ∼ 1.
Case II: There do not exist two such options of X . Let
Xα be an option of X . Since Xα + X + X ∼ 1, and since
there exists no Xβ for which Xα +Xβ +X ∼ 0, there must
exist an option Xαγ of Xα such that Xαγ + X + X ∼ 0.
X +X ∼ 1 or ∞, by Table 6, but X +X cannot be of type
∞, since addingXαγ yields a 0-position. Hence X+X ∼ 1,
and Table 5 implies Xαγ ∼ 2. Since X +X ∼ 1, there must
exist an option Xδ with Xδ + X ∼ 0. Everything we’ve
proved so far about Xα applies equally well to Xδ (since all
we assumed about Xα was that it be some option of X). In
particular, Xδ must have an option Xδǫ such that Xδǫ ∼ 2.
However, since Xδǫ+X is an option of the 0-positionXδ+X ,
Xδǫ +X ∼ 2. Hence Xδǫ and X are two 2-positions whose
sum is a 2-position, contradicting Table 4.
5. NIM FOR THREE
We wish to classify all Nim-positions as belonging to N ,
O, P , or Q — or rather, as we now put it, as being similar to
0, 1, 2, or ∞. We will actually do more, and determine the
equivalence classes of Nim games. Table 8 shows the games
we have classified so far (on the left) and their respective types
(on the right).
0 (0)
1, 11, 111, 1111, ... (1,2,0,1,2,0, ...)
2, 12, 112, 1112, ... (1,∞,1,1,∞,1, ...)
3 (1)
22 (∞)
Table 8. Basic positions of Nim.
We will soon see that every Nim-game is equivalent to one
of the Nim-games in Table 8. We call these reduced Nim-
positions. The last paragraph of this section gives a procedure
for converting a three-player Nim-position into its reduced
form.
Throughout this section (and the rest of this article), the
reader should keep in mind the difference between the nota-
tions 2 and 2. The former is a single Nim-heap of size 2;
the latter is the game-type that corresponds to a second-player
win. Note in particular that 2 is not of type 2 but rather of type
1.
We start our proof of the validity of Table 8 by showing that
no two games in the table are equivalent to each other. In this
we will be assisted by Tables 9 and 10.
m\n 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 . . .
0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 . . .
1 ∞ ∞ 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 . . .
2 1 ∞ ∞ ∞ 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 . . .
3 1 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 1 2 0 1 2 . . .
4 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 1 2 0 . . .
5 1 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 1 . . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Table 9. The type of 1m + 2n.
Table 9 gives the types for games of the form 1m + 2n.
Each row of the chart gives what we shall call the signature of
1m, relative to the sequence 2, {2}, {{2}}, ... . Since no two
games of the form 1m have the same signature, no two are
equivalent.
Similarly, Table 10 is the signature table for games of the
form 1m2, relative to 2n.
m\n 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 . . .
0 ∞ ∞ 1 ∞ 1 1 ∞ 1 1 ∞ 1 . . .
1 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 1 ∞ 1 1 ∞ 1 1 . . .
2 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 1 ∞ 1 1 ∞ . . .
3 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 1 ∞ 1 . . .
4 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 1 . . .
5 ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ . . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Table 10. The type of 1m2 + 2n.
We see that all the games 1m and 1m2 are distinct.
What about 22? It can’t be equivalent to 13k+12 for any k
(even though both are ∞-games), because 22+1 ∼∞ while
13k+12 + 1 = 13k+22 ∼ 1.
What about 3? It can’t be equivalent to 13k+1 for any k,
because 3+1 ∼∞ while 13k+1+1 ∼ 2; it can’t be equivalent
to 13k2 because 3 + 22 ∼ 1 while 13k2 + 22 ∼ ∞; it can’t
be equivalent to 13k+22 because 3 + 1 ∼ ∞ while 13k+22 +
1 = 13k+32 ∼ 1; and it can’t be equivalent to 2 because
{0, 11}+ 2 ∼ 2 while {0, 11}+ 3 ∼∞.
Now that we know that all of the Nim games in Table 8 are
inequivalent, let us show that every Nim game is equivalent to
one of these.
Claim 10. mn ∼∞ for all m,n ≥ 2.
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Proof. Any two players can gang up on the third, by deplet-
ing neither heap until the victim has made his move, and then
removing both heaps.
Claim 11. The following are true for all games G:
(a) Gn 6∼ 0 for n ≥ 2.
(b) Gn 6∼ 2 for n ≥ 3.
(c) If Gm ∼ 1 then Gn ∼ 1, for m,n ≥ 2.
(d) G1n 6∼ 2 for n ≥ 2.
(e) Gmn 6∼ 1 for m,n ≥ 2.
(f) Gmn 6∼ 2 for m,n ≥ 2.
(g) Gmn 6∼ 0 for m,n ≥ 2.
Proof.
(a) Suppose Gn ∼ 0. Then its options G1 and G are 2-
games. But since G is also an option of G1, this is a contra-
diction.
(b) Suppose Gn ∼ 2. Then G, G1, and G2 are all 1-games,
and in particular G2 must have a 0-option. That 0-option can
be neither G nor G1, so there must exist G′2 ∼ 0, contradict-
ing (a).
(c) Assume Gm ∼ 1. Then either G ∼ 0 or G1 ∼ 0 (no
other option of Gm can be of type 0, by (a)), and in either
case Gn ∼ 1.
(d) Suppose G1n ∼ 2. Then G1, G11, and Gn are all 1-
games. Gn must have a 0-option, but G1 ∼ 1 and no option
G′n or Gm (2 ≤ m < n) can be a 0-game (by (a)), so G itself
must be a 0-game. Also, since G11 ∼ 1 and G1 6∼ 0, there
must exist G′ with G′11 ∼ 0. Then G′1 ∼ 2 and G′ ∼ 1,
which is inconsistent with G ∼ 0.
(e) Every option of Gmn has a component heap of size 2
or more, so G+m+ n has no 0-options, by (a).
(f) Suppose Gmn ∼ 2. Then G can’t be 0 (by Claim 10),
so it must have an option G′; G′mn ∼ 1, contradicting (e).
(g) Suppose Gmn ∼ 0. Then G can’t be 0 (by Claim 10),
so it must have an option G′; G′mn ∼ 2, contradicting (f).
Note that (e), (f), and (g) together imply that Gmn ∼ ∞
for all m,n ≥ 2.
Claim 12. The following are true for all games G:
(A) m ≡ n for m,n ≥ 3.
(B) 1m ≡ 1n for m,n ≥ 2.
(C) Gmn ≡ 22 for m,n ≥ 2.
Proof.
(A) Take an arbitrary game X . We know that each of Xm,
Xn is either of type 1 or type ∞ (by (a), (b) above). If either
of them is a 1-game, then so is the other (by (c)), and if neither
of them is a 1-game, then both are ∞-games. Either way,
m+X and n+X have the same type.
(B) The proof is similar, except that one needs (d) instead
of (b).
(C) For all X , Gmn+X = (GX)mn ∼∞ and 22+X =
(X)22 ∼∞.
To reduce a given Nim-position G = n1 + n2 + ... + nr
to one of the previously tabulated forms, first replace every
ni > 3 by 3. This puts G in the form 1a2b3c. If b + c ≥ 2,
then we have G ≡ 22. Otherwise, we have G in the form 1a,
1a2, or 1a3. Since 13 ≡ 12, the last of these cases can be
reduced to 1a2 unless a = 0.
6. EQUIVALENCE CLASSES
The Nim game 22 has the property that if one adds to it any
other Nim-position, one gets a game of type ∞. In fact, if
one adds any game whatsoever to 22, one still gets a game of
type ∞. 22 is thus an element of an important equivalence
class, consisting of all games G such that G+X ∼∞ for all
games X . We call this class the equivalence class of infinity.
This equivalence class is a sort of a black hole, metaphorically
speaking; add any game to the black hole, and all you get is
the black hole.
If you take a two-player game for which a nice theory ex-
ists and study the three-player version, then it is unfortunately
nearly always the case that most of the positions in the game
are in the equivalence class of infinity.
There are some games which are “close” to infinity. Para-
doxically, such games can give us interesting information
about games that are very far away from infinity. Consider,
for instance, the 2-game 21 = {2} (the game whose sole op-
tion is a Nim-heap of size 2).
Claim 13. The only game G for which G + 21 6∼ ∞ is the
game 0.
Proof. Let X be the simplest game not identical to 0 such that
X + 21 6∼∞.
Case I: X+21 ∼ 0. Then X+2 ∼ 2. But Claim 11(b), to-
gether with the fact that 2 is equivalent to every Nim-position
n with n ≥ 3, tells us that this can’t happen.
Case II: X + 21 ∼ 1. The winning option of X + 21 can’t
be X + 2, by Claim 11(a), so it must be an option of the form
X ′+21. But then X ′+21 ∼ 0, which contradicts the assumed
minimality of X . (X ′ = 0 won’t help us, since 0 + 21 ∼ 2,
not 0.)
Case III: X + 21 ∼ 2. Letting X ′ be any option of X , we
have X ′ + 21 ∼ 1. This contradicts the assumed minimality
of X .
This implies that no game is equivalent to 0.
7. OPEN QUESTIONS
Question 1. How do the doubling and tripling tables (Tables
6 and 7) extend to higher compound sums of a game with
itself?
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Question 2. Is there a decision procedure for determining
when two impartial three-player games are equivalent to each
other?
Question 3. What does the “neighborhood of infinity” look
like? The game 21 ∼ 2 has the property that when you add it
to any non-trivial game, you get ∞. Is there a game of type 1
with this property? Is there one of type 0 with this property?
Question 4. How does the theory generalize to n players,
with n > 3? It is not hard to show that the portion of Ta-
ble 5 in the upper left corner generalizes to the case of more
than three players in a straightforward way. However, carry-
ing the theory beyond this point seems like a large job. Here
are two particular questions that seem especially interesting:
Can an n-fold sum of a game with itself be a win for any of
the players other than the nth? Does there exist a “black hole”
X such that for all games Y , X + Y is a win for any coalition
with over half the players?
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